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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
         At issue is the ownership of certain real property in 
Camden, New Jersey.  The district court held that Plaintiff 
Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church ("Scotts 
Church") was the valid titleholder to the property in dispute, 
rejected the counterclaim filed by Defendant Conference of 
African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church ("the 
Conference") to quiet title to the same property, and enjoined 
the Conference from claiming any ownership interest therein.  The 
Conference appeals.   
                               I.  
                            Background 
         Scotts Church was incorporated in 1915 as a nonprofit 
corporation under New Jersey's Act to Incorporate Associations 
Not For Pecuniary Profit, ch. 181, 1898 N.J. Laws 422, repealed 
by New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, ch. 127, 1983 N.J. Laws 
397 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 15A:2-1).  It had acquired 
property on Kaighn Avenue in Camden, New Jersey around 1904, and 
conducted religious services and other activities there until 
1974.  In 1974, Scotts Church sold the Kaighn Avenue property and 
used the proceeds to purchase property on Baird Boulevard in 
Camden, with title in the name of Scotts Church. 
         At some point in time left unspecified in the record, 
see App. at 11; Joint Final Pre-Trial Order at 2-4, Scotts Church 
became a member congregation of the Conference.  The Conference 
is the administrative body of a religious organization known as 
the African Union Methodist Protestant ("AUMP") Church.  The 
AUMP Church is a regional association of several local churches 
located in the mid-Atlantic states and tied by their common 
adherence to the AUMP denomination and doctrine.  The association 
was incorporated in Delaware in 1941 and changed its name to "The 
Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant 
Church" in 1953.  Def. ex. 15.  The Conference claims itself the 
successor to the Union Church of Africans, which was incorporated 
in 1813, although that was an issue of fact determined against 
the Conference at trial.  
         The Conference is defined in the Book of Discipline, 
see infra, as an "administrative body in the [structure] of the 
AUMP Church," Pl. ex. 5 at 157, although there is some ambiguity 
in the record as to whether the Conference and the AUMP Church 
are distinct entities.  We need not resolve this question for 
purposes of this appeal.  The Conference and the AUMP Church are 
governed by The Book of Discipline of the African Union First 
Colored Methodist Protestant Church and Connection in the United 
States of America and the World ("Book of Discipline" or 
"Discipline"), which contains rules and procedures that serve as 
corporate bylaws of the Conference and Scotts Church.  Scotts 
Church regularly has sent delegates to Conference meetings 
involving local church participation.  It additionally has 
concluded annual "pastoral contracts" with pastors selected for 
it by the Conference, whom Scotts Church agreed to compensate and 
retain on a yearly basis.  
         The pastoral contracts concluded for the 1990-91 and 
1991-92 years state that the trustees of Scotts Church "will be 
responsible as to all mentioned in the Book of Discipline 
according to the 1958 AUFCMP Church, Inc., and any/all revisions 
made to the Book of Discipline, entitled the Duties of the 
Trustees."  Def. exs. 3, 4.  The contracts also provide that the 
pastor of Scotts Church "is responsible to Trustees of the above 
said mentioned Church, of the first part, [and] will be 
responsible as to all mentioned in the Book of Discipline 
according to the 1958 AUFCMP Church, Inc. and any/all revision[s] 
made to the Book of Discipline, entitled The Duty of Ministers in 
Charge."  Id.  
         On January 19, 1991, the Conference held a meeting at 
which the attendees approved a resolution entitled "Church 
Property" ("Property Resolution").  The present dispute between 
Scotts Church and the Conference implicates three portions of the 
Property Resolution's text in particular.  The first is a 
paragraph entitled "Titles to Properties" and provides in 
relevant part: 
         [T]itles to all properties held . . . by a 
         local church . . . shall be held in trust for 
         The African Union Methodist Protestant Church 
         and subject to the provisions of its 
         Discipline.  Titles are not held by The 
         African Union Methodist Protestant Church or 
         by "The General Conference of The African 
         Union Methodist Protestant Church," but 
         instead by the incorporated conferences, 
         agencies, or organizations of the 
         denomination, or in the case of 
         unincorporated bod[i]es of the denomination, 
         by boards of trustees established for the 
         purpose of holding and administering 
         property. 
 
Def. ex. 1 at C-1.   
 
         The second portion of the 1991 Property Resolution, a 
group of paragraphs under the heading "Trust Clauses in Deeds," 
requires in part that "all written instruments of conveyance" by 
which church properties are held or acquired for worship purposes 
contain the following language: 
         In trust, that said premises shall be used, 
         kept, and maintained as a place of divine 
         worship of the African Union Methodist 
         Protestant ministry and members of The 
         African Union Methodist Protestant Church, 
         subject to the Discipline, usage, and 
         ministerial appointments of said church as 
         from time to time auth[or]ized and declared 
         by the General Conference and by the Annual 
         Conference within whose bounds the said 
         premises are situated.  This provision is 
         solely for the benefit of the grantee, and 
         the grantor reserves no right or interest in 
         said premises. 
 
Id.  This "Trust Clauses in Deeds" portion of the Property 
Resolution also provides that where a deed exists without the 
required trust clause language, the local church nevertheless 
owes a "responsibility and accountability" to the AUMP Church if 
it has affirmed its affiliation by accepting a Conference- 
appointed pastor.  Id. at C-2.  For purposes of his decision, the 
magistrate judge assumed that this "responsibility and 
accountability" language was intended to compel a local church to 
hold its property in trust for the Conference even where the 
governing deed omitted the required trust clause.  App. at 21.   
         Finally, a paragraph of the Property Resolution 
entitled "Incorporated Local Church Property -- Title and 
Purchase," provides:  
         [T]he title to all property, now owned or 
         hereafter acquired by an incorporated local 
         church . . . shall be held by and/or conveyed 
         to the corporate body in its corporate name, 
         in trust for the use and benefit of such 
         local church and of The African Union 
         Methodist Protestant Church.  
 
Def. ex. 1 at C-11.  According to an affidavit and testimony from 
Bishop Delbert Jackson, Presiding Prelate of the Conference, the 
Property Resolution became an amendment to the Book of Disciplineupon 
adoption.  See Summ. Judg. Op. at 20; Trial Transcript at 
41; see also Appellant's Brief at 8.  
         Some three months later, at a meeting held on 
April 6, 1991, the Conference approved a "Signature Resolution" 
which provides that "ministers in charge of [the local] churches 
shall be empowered to sign official documents pertaining to the 
individual local church and The Conference."  Def. ex. 2; App. at 
21-22.  According to Bishop Jackson's affidavit, the Signature 
Resolution, like the Property Resolution, constituted an 
amendment to the Book of Discipline upon adoption.  See Summ. 
Judg. Op. at 21. 
         The Conference promptly used these two resolutions as 
ostensible authority to take title to property held by the local 
churches, a move that we are told generated a number of 
lawsuits.  At the April 6, 1991 meeting, the Conference -- 
invoking its newly adopted Signature Resolution -- instructed 
Scotts Church pastor Dr. Eva M. Walters to sign a quitclaim deed 
transferring Scotts Church's Baird Boulevard property to the 
Conference.  Dr. Walters signed the deed, which states that "the 
trustees of the SCOTTS AFRICAN UNION METHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH 
have caused its name by Reverend Dr. Eva M. Walters, its Pastor, 
to be hereunto set."  Pl. ex. 3.  The deed was recorded on April 
26, 1991. 
         Scotts Church's certificate of incorporation dated 1915 
provides that its trustees "shall not dispose of any real estate 
so acquired by them as Trustees, except [as] such act be 
authorized by a vote of two thirds of the members of said Church 
Body."  Pl. ex. 1.  Neither the trustees nor the members of 
Scotts Church approved the transfer of the Baird Boulevard 
property, and on March 26, 1992 -- by a 24-0 vote of its members 
-- Scotts Church opted to disaffiliate itself from the 
Conference. 
         Scotts Church filed suit in January 1992 in the 
Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden 
County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Conference held 
no interest in the Baird Boulevard property and that the 
quitclaim deed was invalid, as well as injunctive relief 
preventing the Conference from asserting any ownership interest 
in the property.  The Conference, alleging both federal question 
and diversity jurisdiction, had the case removed to the United 
States District Court of New Jersey.  Counterclaiming to have 
"its" title to the Baird Boulevard property quieted, the 
Conference also moved for dismissal of the action, summary 
judgment, and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.  The Conference's 
motions were denied.   
         In ruling on the summary judgment motion, the district 
court addressed, inter alia, the Conference's argument that under 
First Amendment principles the court must give deference to the 
determinations of the Conference, as the highest authority in a 
hierarchical church.  The court rejected that argument, relying 
on the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Elmora Hebrew Center 
v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991), to hold that the courts of 
New Jersey would apply "neutral principles of law" to resolve 
this dispute rather than deferring to the church hierarchy. 
         The parties consented to trial by a magistrate judge 
(hereafter interchangeably referred to as the "trial court") 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) who, after a one-day bench trial, 
determined the quitclaim deed invalid and granted the declaratory 
and injunctive relief sought by Scotts Church.  Scotts Church had 
contended that the deed was invalid because Bishop Jackson had 
fraudulently induced Dr. Walters to sign by falsely assuring her 
that the Scotts Church trustees had already authorized the 
transfer.  The magistrate judge found no evidence to support that 
assertion or the fact that Dr. Walters had relied upon any 
representation regarding the trustees' approval upon signing the 
deed.  App. at 23. 
          Instead, the magistrate judge, applying "neutral 
principles of law" in accordance with the district court's 
summary judgment opinion, evaluated the relevant documents, 
provisions, and factual circumstances, and determined that the 
quitclaim deed was invalid and that Scotts Church retained title 
to the disputed property.  The content of that determination can 
be described in terms of six distinct issues, though the opinion 
itself was not organized accordingly. 
(1) Scotts Church Certificate of Incorporation 
         The first was the text of Scotts Church's certificate 
of incorporation, which dates from 1915.  That certificate reads, 
in relevant part: 
         AFRICAN UNION FIRST COLORED METHODIST 
         PROTESTANT CHURCH OF CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY. 
 
              THIS IS TO CERTIFY that we, Perry 
         Gleaves, Leonard S. Smith, John F. Bartee, 
         Thomas Kenaman, Enoch Grisden, Joseph Pierce, 
         and Charles Stewart, do hereby associate 
         ourselves into a corporation under and by 
         virtue of an act of the Legislature of the 
         State of New Jersey . . . . 
 
         1.   The name of the association or 
         corporation is AFRICAN UNION FIRST COLORED 
         METHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH OF CAMDEN, NEW 
         JERSEY. 
 
         2.   The purposes for which this association 
         or corporation is formed are for the worship 
         of Almighty God in accordance with the 
         dictates of our consciences and the rules[,] 
         regulations, doctrines, practices and beliefs 
         of the African Union Colored Methodist 
         Protestant Church; 
 
              To acquire and possess property, both 
         real and personal, as Trustees as aforesaid, 
         by gift, grant or devise and to hold same in 
         trust for the uses and purposes of said 
         Church Body; to mortgage and dispose of the 
         same. 
 
              That said Trustees shall not dispose of 
         any real estate so acquired by them as 
         Trustees, except [as] such act be authorized 
         by a vote of two thirds of the members of 
         said Church Body, who shall have been members 
         in good standing in said Church Body for at 
         least one year before the date of the meeting 
         at which such action shall be proposed. 
 
              That the Trustees of said African Union 
         First Colored Methodist Protestant Church of 
         Camden, New Jersey shall, at the time of 
         their election, have been members of said 
         Church in good standing for at least one year 
         preceding their election . . . . 
 
              The successors to the Trustees 
         hereinbefore named shall be [e]lected by 
         ballot . . . at a meeting of the members of 
         the Church . . . . 
 
              . . . . 
 
         4.   There shall be seven Trustees of this 
         association or corporation and the names of 
         those selected for the first year are as 
         follows.  [The same seven names listed at the 
         beginning of the certificate are here 
         repeated, with accompanying Camden 
         addresses.] 
          
 
Pl. ex. 1 (emphasis added). 
 
         The parties disputed, in particular, the meaning of the 
second clause of Paragraph 2 ("To acquire and possess property 
. . .").  Scotts Church argued that the phrase "said Church Body" 
appearing in that clause referred to the same church body 
appearing both at the top of the certificate and in Paragraph 1:  
the "African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church of 
Camden, New Jersey," (emphasis added), or Scotts Church.  Scotts 
Church contended, therefore, that its certificate of 
incorporation specifically provided that property acquired by 
Scotts Church would be held "in trust for the uses and purposes" 
of Scotts Church, and prohibited the disposition of such property 
unless authorized by a two-thirds vote of its members.   
         The Conference, on the other hand, insisted that the 
same phrase "said Church Body" more naturally referred to the 
denominational entity "African Union Colored Methodist Protestant 
Church," the church body mentioned in the clause immediately 
preceding it in Paragraph 2.  It argued, therefore, that the 
certificate of incorporation mandated that property acquired by 
Scotts Church be held in trust for the AUMP Church.     
         The magistrate judge determined that the text of the 
certificate supported Scotts Church's interpretation.  First, he 
observed that although the Paragraph 2 reference to the AUMP 
Church specified adherence to the doctrine of that particular 
denomination, the Conference itself as an administrative body was 
nowhere mentioned in the document.  See App. at 16-17.   
         Second, the magistrate judge interpreted the second 
clause of Paragraph 2 in light of the clause immediately 
following it, which permitted the disposition of property only 
where "authorized by a vote of two thirds of the members of said 
Church Body, who shall have been members in good standing in said 
Church Body."  The magistrate judge relied on the two-thirds vote 
and members-in-good-standing references, and the improbability 
that either would involve the entire population of the AUMP 
organizational hierarchy, as strong indication that the recurring 
phrase "said Church Body" referred to the Scotts Church 
congregation proper.  See App. at 17.   
         Third, the magistrate judge assumed arguendo, as the 
Conference urged, that the Book of Discipline and Invisible 
Strands, a historical tract, established that the African Union 
Church was incorporated in 1813 and that the African Union Church 
merged in 1865 with the First Colored Methodist Protestant Church 
to form the African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant 
Church.  Nevertheless, he found those facts insufficient to 
establish that the Conference was the same entity as, or legal 
successor to, the African Union Church.  The magistrate judge 
reasoned that as the Conference had failed to show that it had 
existed as a legal entity at any time before its own 1941 
incorporation, it could not have been the legal beneficiary of a 
1915 trust provision.  He thus determined that Scotts Church's 
1915 certificate of incorporation could not have directed the 
holding of property in trust for the yet unformed Conference.  
See App. at 12-14, 17.   
         Under the magistrate judge's interpretation of the 
certificate of incorporation, Scotts Church's property was held 
in trust for Scotts Church itself and subject to transfer only 
upon trustee and congregation approval.  It followed that the 
April 6, 1991 quitclaim deed was invalid unless the Conference 
could provide a basis for overriding the certificate of 
incorporation. 
(2) Property Resolution  
         The magistrate judge rejected the Conference's 
contention that the Property Resolution could provide a basis for 
the quitclaim deed.  The magistrate judge observed that while the 
language of the Property Resolution requiring local churches to 
hold their property in trust for the AUMP Church may have imposed 
upon the local churches certain obligations, none of its terms 
empowered pastors to transfer property by signing deeds.  The 
magistrate judge determined that the resolution's text in fact 
"required incorporated local churches to hold property in their 
own name, in trust for the purposes of that local church and for 
the AUMP Church," and therefore did not "legitimize a deed which 
purports to transfer property out of the name of Scotts Church 
and to [the Conference]."  App. at 26. 
         In addition, the magistrate judge declared the Property 
Resolution void because it was adopted at a meeting for which 
inadequate notice had been provided.  He noted that the Book of 
Discipline did not establish notice requirements for Conference 
meetings, and held that where a corporation's bylaws prescribe no 
such requirements "notice shall be given as provided for in state 
or local law."  App. at 36.  He therefore applied Title 8, § 222 
of the Delaware Code requiring written notice of the place, time, 
and purpose of a special meeting "not less than 10 nor more than 
60 days before the date of the meeting."  App. at 36-37 (quoting 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 222(b)).  Finding that no such notice 
had been given, the magistrate judge declared the Property 
Resolution to be the product of a procedurally defective meeting, 
and therefore invalid.   
(3) Signature Resolution 
         The magistrate judge also eliminated the Signature 
Resolution as a possible basis for the validity of the April 6 
quitclaim deed.  As with the Property Resolution, the magistrate 
judge first examined the language of the Signature Resolution and 
noted that while the resolution authorized local pastors to sign 
official business documents on behalf of local churches, nothing 
in the Signature Resolution eliminated the specific requirement 
applicable to Scotts Church that the church members first approve 
property transfers.  Rather, the Signature Resolution "merely 
authorizes Dr. Walters to sign the deed once the vote has been 
taken and action authorized."  App. at 26.   
         This interpretation is confirmed by statements made at 
the April 6, 1991 meeting by Bishop Jackson, and placed into 
evidence by an audiotape of the meeting, which the magistrate 
judge discussed as follows: 
         When asked whether the Signature Resolution 
         would override the authority of local church 
         trustees, the Bishop replied that the 
         resolution "does not take away the power of 
         the trustees."  The Bishop repeatedly 
         reassured the members that the resolution did 
         not change existing procedures, that the 
         pastor and trustees are to work together in 
         any business action, and that the resolution 
         only gave the pastor the power to sign alongwith the trustees.  
In response to one 
         member's concern that the pastor could 
         potentially act without the members' 
         knowledge and "squeeze" the trustees out of 
         power, the Bishop replied, "Before the pastor 
         or the trustees can do anything, they have to 
         take it back to the people." 
 
              The attorney present at the meeting to 
         present this resolution, K. Kay Shearin, 
         Esq., also assured the members that "what the 
         Bishop told you a few minutes ago was 
         absolutely right."  Ms. Shearin explained the 
         impact of the Signature Resolution as simply 
         giving the local churches the power of the 
         Conference behind them when they want to 
         transact business, particularly when they 
         want to borrow money for expansion and 
         development projects.  "We're not taking 
         anything away from the individual churches.  
         The local trustees still have their 
         authority." 
 
App. at 26-27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
         Viewing these assurances as further undercutting any 
possibility that the Signature Resolution had displaced either 
Scotts Church's two-thirds vote requirement for property 
transfers or the autonomy of its trustees, the magistrate judge 
held that the Signature Resolution, like the Property Resolution, 
"did not provide authority for Dr. Walters to sign a deed 
conveying the property in the absence of member and trustee 
approval," and therefore could not establish the validity of the 
quitclaim deed.  App. at 27. 
(4) Counterclaim/Secession Clause       
         The magistrate judge also rejected the Conference's 
counterclaim to quiet title.  The Conference had contended that 
even if the quitclaim deed was invalid, once Scott Church 
seceded, the Conference necessarily emerged as titleholder 
because Scotts Church was to hold property in trust for the 
Conference.  The magistrate judge noted that the 1974 deed placed 
title to the Baird Boulevard property in Scotts Church's name 
without trust language, and thus neither the deed nor the text of 
Scotts Church's certificate of incorporation bound Scotts Church 
to hold the property in trust for the Conference.  
         The only remaining argument proffered by the Conference 
in support of its counterclaim was based on a clause in the Book 
of Discipline that all church property "belonging to the 
Connection shall be deeded to the members and Connection, and 
should the members disband or secede the property shall remain in 
the possession of the Connection."  Def. ex. 10; App. at 29.  The 
provision further states that "each local Church shall be so 
incorporated that if the members should disband or secede, the 
said Church and property shall remain in the Connection."  Id.  
This secession clause, which appeared in the seventeenth edition 
of the Book of Discipline that was published in 1958, was 
apparently omitted from the most recent eighteenth edition of 
1986.    
         The magistrate judge rejected the applicability of the 
secession clause on multiple grounds.  First, he observed that 
the clause appeared only in a section of the 1958 Disciplineentitled "The 
Duty of Ministers in Charge."  Def. ex. 10; App. at 
29.  Citing the text of the 1990-91 and 1991-92 pastoral 
contracts, the magistrate judge concluded that the provisions of 
that section bound only Scotts Church's pastor individually, 
rather than the local church collectively. 
         Second, the magistrate judge determined that the 1958 
Discipline's secession clause, omitted from the current 1986 18th 
edition, was not effective at the time of Scotts Church's 
secession from the Conference in 1992, nor during the pendency of 
the 1990-92 pastoral contracts that required adherence to the 
Book of Discipline. 
         Finally, the magistrate judge found that the terms of 
the secession clause were so vague as to be inapplicable.  The 
clause specifies that, upon a local church's secession, the 
church property "shall remain in the possession of the 
Connection."  The magistrate judge noted that the Book of 
Discipline defined the "Connection" as "[t]he structural 
organization of all AUMP Local Churches having a connected 
network of compatible interdependent relationships to achieve the 
purpose of the church," but defined the "Conference" in different 
terms -- "[a]n administrative body in the struct[ure] of the AUMP 
Church such as general, annual, district, quarterly and ch[u]rch 
conference."  Pl. ex. 5 at 157; App. at 31.  Finding those 
divergent descriptions enough to prevent the "broad assumption" 
that property belonging to the Connection also belonged 
"derivatively" to the Conference, and invoking the principle that 
ambiguous language be construed against the drafter, the 
magistrate judge determined the secession clause ineffective.  
App. at 31-32.     
(5) Constructive Trust 
         The magistrate judge declined the Conference's request 
to create a constructive trust in its favor, finding that Scotts 
Church did not obtain any unjust enrichment nor perform any 
wrongful act.  See App. at 32-33. 
(6) Conflict Rule 
         Finally, the magistrate judge noted that where a 
corporation's certificate of incorporation and bylaws are in 
conflict, New Jersey law dictates that "the certificate of 
incorporation ordinarily governs."  App. at 38.  Thus, the 
magistrate judge concluded that even if the Conference's claims 
regarding its Property Resolution were given full weight, the 
Resolution would be ineffective because it conflicted with the 
procedures in Scotts Church's certificate of incorporation for 
the disposition of property. 
         The magistrate judge accordingly entered declaratory 
judgment for Scotts Church, declaring the quitclaim deed invalid, 
and further enjoined the Conference from claiming any ownership 
interest in the disputed property.  The Conference appeals.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We must accept 
the magistrate judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Grupo Protexa v. All American 
Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 481 (1994); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 128 
(3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656 (1987).  Our review of the 
legal conclusions, including the assessment of state law, is 
plenary.  Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366, 1368 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
                               II.  
                            Discussion 
A. Federal Constitutional Law 
         The Conference argues that the magistrate judge erred 
as a matter of law in applying neutral principles instead of the 
principle of deference.  To understand this contention, we must 
travel through the Supreme Court's precedents involving 
intrachurch property disputes, in which it has attempted to draw 
a line between the constitutional interest in preserving the 
autonomy of religious organizations, on the one hand, and the 
civil interest in the definitive settlement of property disputes, 
on the other.  We review each of the applicable Supreme Court 
decisions.  As viewed seriatim, they provide historical 
perspective to the current status of the law. 
         The first such case, Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 679 (1871), arose from a post-Civil War dispute between 
pro- and anti-slavery factions of a Kentucky church that was a 
member of the Presbyterian Church of the United States.  The pro- 
slavery group, which was the minority faction, claimed title to 
the church property based on the fact that its views were more 
consistent with the teachings of the Presbyterian Church at the 
time of the Kentucky church's founding.  The Presbytery of 
Louisville, the next highest governing church body after the 
church itself, declared the pro-slavery minority the true church 
body and, therefore, rightful titleholder.  The General Assembly, 
however, the highest governing body in the Presbyterian Church, 
decided in favor of the majority abolitionist faction instead.  
         The Watson Court, following the General Assembly's 
result, ruled in the abolitionist group's favor, and in the 
process established the following principles:  federal courts are 
competent to enforce express terms contained in trust instruments 
governing the use or ownership of property.  80 U.S. at 723-24.  
However, courts may not resolve nor inquire into matters of 
religious doctrine in order to determine entitlements to 
property.  Id. at 725, 727-29.  Where a dispute arises between 
factions of an independent congregation, "the rights of such 
bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the 
ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations;" if the 
church had always governed itself by majority rule, for example, 
the majority faction would prevail.  Id. at 725.  Finally, where 
the dispute is between subordinate and superior bodies of a 
single hierarchical church organization, and 
         whenever the questions of discipline or of 
         faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law 
         have been decided by the highest of these 
         church judicatories to which the matter has 
         been carried, the legal tribunals must accept 
         such decisions as final, and as binding on 
         them, in their application to the case before 
         them. 
 
Id. at 727.   
 
         The Watson approach is popularly termed the "deference" 
approach, and requires judicial recognition of the decisions of a 
hierarchical church's highest body on matters of discipline, 
faith or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.  Although Watson was 
decided before the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to render 
the First Amendment applicable to the states, and therefore 
cannot strictly be termed a "constitutional" interpretation, 
later Supreme Court opinions have recognized its holding as 
grounded in concerns of constitutional dimension.  See, e.g., 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).   
         The Watson rule of deference was further defined in 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), a case 
in which a layman sued the Archbishop, claiming a right to be 
appointed to a chaplaincy and to receive a concomitant income 
according to the terms of a trust created 100 years earlier by an 
ancestor.  The Archbishop had refused to appoint the plaintiff on 
the ground that he did not meet the qualifications for a chaplain 
specified by the 1918 Code of Canon Law.  The Supreme Court 
rejected the Archbishop's contention that secular courts lacked 
any jurisdiction over the case because of the ecclesiastical 
nature of the dispute, holding instead that there was subject 
matter jurisdiction because the suit involved an attempt to 
enforce the terms of a trust.  Id. at 16.  Nonetheless, the Court 
deferred to the Archbishop's decision to deny the petitioner the 
chaplaincy, holding:   
         Because the appointment is a canonical act, 
         it is the function of the church authorities 
         to determine what the essential 
         qualifications of a chaplain are and whether 
         the candidate possesses them.  In the absence 
         of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the 
         decisions of the proper church tribunals on 
         matters purely ecclesiastical, although 
         affecting civil rights, are accepted in 
         litigation before the secular courts as 
         conclusive, because the parties in interest 
         made them so by contract or otherwise. 
 
Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Thus, while 
Watson directed blanket judicial deference to determinations of a 
church's highest body in ecclesiastical matters, dictum in 
Gonzalez suggested there could be some judicial review of church 
decisions in those exceptional cases in which "fraud, collusion, 
or arbitrariness" was alleged. 
         The next case, Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 
U.S. 94 (1952), involved a dispute over use and occupancy of the 
Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York between Archbishop Leonty, 
elected to preside over all Russian Orthodox churches in America 
by the local churches themselves, and Archbishop Fedchenkoff, 
appointed to preside over the same churches by the Supreme Church 
Authority in Moscow.  The decision as to the rightful occupant 
turned on which of the two had been validly selected as ruling 
hierarch for the American churches.  The Supreme Court ruled in 
Fedchenkoff's favor, stating that matters of "ecclesiastical 
government" were among those "questions" marked by Watson as out- 
of-bounds for civil adjudication, id. at 115, and noting that 
"[e]ven in those cases when the property right follows as an 
incident from decisions of the church custom or law on 
ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls," id. at 120-21 
(footnote omitted). 
         The Court's subsequent opinion in Presbyterian Church 
in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), is of particular 
significance to the issue before us.  That case involved the 
decision of two Presbyterian churches in Georgia to withdraw from 
the national Presbyterian Church in the United States because of 
the latter's progressive tendencies (ordination of women, church 
pronouncements on political issues, etc.).  The general church 
acknowledged their withdrawal and attempted to reabsorb the local 
church properties.  The local churches responded with lawsuits in 
state court.   
         Holding that Georgia law implied a trust of local 
church property for the benefit of the general church so long as 
the general church adhered to the same "tenets of faith and 
practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local 
churches," the state trial court presented the case to a jury, 
which was instructed to determine whether the general church's 
actions constituted a "substantial abandonment" of its "original 
tenets and doctrines."  Id. at 443.  The jury found in favor of 
the local churches, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. 
         The Supreme Court of the United States overturned the 
decision, explaining that 
         [i]t is obvious . . . that not every civil 
         court decision as to property claimed by a 
         religious organization jeopardizes values 
         protected by the First Amendment.  Civil 
         courts do not inhibit free exercise of 
         religion merely by opening their doors to 
         disputes involving church property.  And 
         there are neutral principles of law, 
         developed for use in all property disputes, 
         which can be applied without "establishing" 
         churches to which property is awarded.  But 
         First Amendment values are plainly 
         jeopardized when church property litigation 
         is made to turn on the resolution by civil 
         courts of controversies over religious 
         doctrine and practice.  
 
393 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).   
         Thus, as an alternative to the Watson/Gonzalezdeference approach 
where the courts would be "engaging in the 
narrowest kind of review of a specific church decision [to 
determine] whether [the decision] resulted from fraud, collusion, 
or arbitrariness," id. at 451, the Presbyterian Church Court 
suggested that the Georgia courts could apply "neutral 
principles" of secular property law to resolve intrachurch 
disputes.  
         One year later, in Maryland and Virginia Eldership of 
the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 
U.S. 367 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld a state court's 
application of this "neutral-principles" approach in a three- 
sentence per curiam opinion.  The case involved an intrachurch 
property dispute between the General Eldership of the church and 
two secessionist congregations.  Citing the Maryland appeals 
court's reliance "upon provisions of state statutory law 
governing the holding of property by religious corporations, upon 
language in the deeds conveying the properties in question to the 
local church corporations, upon the terms of the charters of the 
corporations, and upon provisions in the constitution of the 
General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and control of 
church property," the Court concluded that "resolution of the 
dispute involved no inquiry into religious doctrine" and 
therefore did not violate the First Amendment.  Id. at 367-68.    
         Justice Brennan, apparently intent on providing state 
courts with some explanatory guidance, filed a concurring 
opinion, outlining the acceptable approaches to intrachurch 
disputes:  "[A] State may adopt any one of various approaches for 
settling church property disputes so long as it involves no 
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and 
liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith."  Id. at 368 (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
         Justice Brennan identified and contrasted the deference 
approach and the neutral-principles approach.  A state may adopt 
the deference approach taken in Watson and "enforce the property 
decisions" made within a church of congregational or hierarchical 
polity unless "'express' terms in the 'instrument by which the 
property is held' condition the property's use or control in a 
specified manner."  Id. at 368-69 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 
722).  The latter instance would be appropriate for application 
of the neutral-principles approach in intrachurch disputes.  
Citing Presbyterian Church, Justice Brennan stated:  "'[N]eutral 
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes,' 
provide another means for resolving litigation over religious 
property.  Under the 'formal title' doctrine, civil courts can 
determine ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and 
general state corporation laws."  Id. at 370.  He cautioned, 
however,  that "general principles of property law may not be 
relied upon if their application requires civil courts to resolve 
doctrinal issues.  For example, provisions in deeds or in a 
denomination's constitution for the reversion of local church 
property to the general church, if conditioned upon a finding of 
departure from doctrine, could not be civilly enforced."  Id.(emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted).   
         The dispute in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the 
United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), 
the next case in the series, was over control of the Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox American-Canadian Diocese, its property and its 
assets.  In response to complaints about the Diocese's Bishop, 
Bishop Dionisije, the central church removed him as Bishop and 
reorganized the American-Canadian Diocese into three new 
dioceses.  The Diocesan National Assembly subsequently repudiated 
the central church's actions and declared the Diocese completely 
autonomous.  Bishop Dionisije filed suit in state court seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief. 
         The Illinois Supreme Court entered judgment that 
invalidated Bishop Dionisije's removal as "arbitrary" because the 
removal proceedings were not conducted according to the court's 
interpretation of the Church's constitution and penal code and 
voided the Diocesan reorganization as beyond the scope of the 
central church's authority.  Id. at 708.  The United States 
Supreme Court overturned both parts of the judgment, and 
explained:   
         The fallacy fatal to the judgment . . . is 
         that it rests upon an impermissible rejection 
         of the decisions of the highest 
         ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical 
         church upon the issues in dispute, and 
         impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry 
         into church polity and resolutions based 
         thereon of those disputes. 
 
Id.   
         The Court declared that "where resolution of the 
disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry . . . into 
religious law and polity," courts must accept the applicable 
decision of the highest church body in a hierarchical church as 
binding.  Id. at 709.  The Court noted (1) that the First 
Amendment's command that civil courts refrain from resolving 
controversies over religious doctrine "applie[d] with equal force 
to church disputes over church polity and church administration," 
id. at 710, (2) that, Gonzalez notwithstanding, no 
"arbitrariness" exception existed "in the sense of an inquiry 
whether the decision of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a 
hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations," 
id. at 713, (3) that the court's evaluation of conflicting 
testimony concerning internal church procedures and rejection of 
the highest church body's interpretations were particularly 
inappropriate, id. at 718-19, (4) that reliance on "neutral 
principles" could not justify a court's substitution of its own 
interpretation of church rules for that of the church's highest 
body, id. at 721, and (5) that the church constitutional 
provisions at issue "were not so express that the civil courts 
could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore 
impermissible inquiry into church polity," id. at 723.   
         The final case in the series, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595 (1979), gives shape to the proper modern judicial approach to 
intrachurch disputes.  Jones arose from a dispute between two 
factions of a Presbyterian church congregation in Macon, Georgia 
over possession and use of the church property.  The church had 
always been a member of the Presbyterian Church in the United 
States ("PCUS"), but a majority of the congregation voted to 
disassociate the church from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian 
Church in America.  The Augusta-Macon Presbytery, the next 
highest body in the PCUS hierarchy after the congregation itself, 
appointed a commission to investigate and it ruled the minority 
faction constituted the "true congregation."  So armed, the 
minority faction sued in state court for exclusive possession and 
use of the church property. 
         Georgia's courts had adopted the neutral-principles 
approach to resolve intrachurch property disputes and, purporting 
to apply them, the trial court reasoned that because the deed 
conveyed the property to the local church, and neither state law, 
the corporate charter of the local church, nor the constitution 
of the general church created any trust in favor of the general 
church, legal title to the property was vested in the local  
congregation.  Then, without further elaboration, the trial court 
declared the majority faction to be the "true congregation" 
entitled to possession.  The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 
         The United States Supreme Court upheld the Georgia 
Supreme Court's reliance on the neutral-principles approach and 
reaffirmed the viability of that approach under the Constitution.  
The Court stated that "[t]he primary advantages of the neutral- 
principles approach are that it is completely secular in 
operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of 
religious organization and polity."  Id. at 603.  It continued, 
"[t]he method relies exclusively on objective, well-established 
concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and 
judges.  It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from 
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and 
practice."  Id.  
         The Court noted that although the Augusta-Macon 
Presbytery, the highest church body to decide the question, had 
declared the minority faction to be the congregation, the Georgia 
Supreme Court had determined just the opposite.  Significantly, 
notwithstanding Watson's deference approach and the decision in 
Milivojevich, the Supreme Court did not hold that the result by 
the Georgia courts could not be sustained.  Instead, the Court 
held that there was no requirement that the Georgia Supreme Court 
adopt a rule of compulsory deference.  Nonetheless, because the 
basis for the Georgia courts' decision that the majority faction 
represented the "true congregation" of the local church was 
unclear and was made without adequate analysis, the Supreme Court 
remanded for determination by the Georgia courts whether that 
state had adopted a presumptive rule that a voluntary religious 
organization is represented by a majority of its members.  If so, 
then the Georgia courts' judgment awarding the property to the 
majority faction would stand under the neutral-principles 
approach.  However, the Court cautioned that if Georgia law 
provided instead that a congregation's identity should be 
determined according to the rules of the hierarchical parent 
church, the Georgia courts would owe deference to the 
Presbytery's determination in favor of the minority faction.  Seeid. at 
609.   
         It is evident from the above that before we can apply 
the instructions learned from the Supreme Court's cases to the 
issue at hand, we must determine whether the district court 
correctly ruled that New Jersey has adopted the neutral- 
principles approach.  To do so, we examine the leading cases in 
that state.  
B. New Jersey Law 
         Subsumed in the Conference's legal argument is its 
understanding that New Jersey has not adopted the neutral- 
principles approach.  It is certainly true that in Protestant 
Episcopal Church v. Graves, 417 A.2d 19 (N.J. 1980), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 
1131 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reviewed the history and workings of both the deference and 
neutral-principles approaches and, over a strong dissent that 
favored the neutral-principles approach, announced: 
         In the absence of express trust provisions, 
         we conclude that the hierarchical (Watson) 
         approach should be utilized in church 
         property disputes in this State.  Only where 
         no hierarchical control is involved, should 
         the neutral principles of law principle be 
         called into play. 
 
Id. at 24.   
         In that case, a local Protestant Episcopal church had 
voted to disaffiliate from the New Jersey Diocese and the larger 
church organization, and the Diocese sued to restrain the 
dissenting parishioners from any use of the church property not 
sanctioned by the Diocese.  Although the Conference argues that 
this case is controlling, it is distinguishable from the Scotts 
Church dispute in a critical respect.  Unlike the present case in 
which the deed names the local church itself, title to the 
property at issue in Graves was in the Rector, Wardens and 
Vestrymen of the local church.  Ownership therefore turned on who 
held those positions, which was a hotly contested subject of 
dispute between the parties.  The Rector had been 
"ecclesiastically deposed" by the Diocese and the Wardens and 
Vestrymen had arguably disqualified themselves from holding those 
offices by disaffiliating from the central church.   
         This dispute was clearly one of church governance.  As 
the Graves court observed:  "The basic dispute herein is 
unquestionably doctrinal in nature, the ecclesiastical 
determination of which incidentally affects the control over 
local church property."  Id. (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976)).  Thus, even under a neutral-principles approach, the 
court would have had to defer to the resolution of the 
authoritative ecclesiastical body.  See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
at 604 (under neutral principles, where deed incorporates 
religious concepts in provisions relating to ownership, and 
interpretation would require court to resolve religious 
controversy, court must defer to church hierarchy). 
         The deference rule was summarily applied by the New 
Jersey court to resolve another intrachurch property dispute 
between a diocese of the Protestant Episcopal Church and local 
church officials decided the same day and involving virtually 
identical facts.  See Diocese of Newark v. Burns, 417 A.2d 31, 33 
(N.J. 1980) ("All of these contentions as well as the ancillary 
points raised by defendants have been considered and disposed of 
in our opinion in Graves.  There we approved the hierarchical 
church approach utilized in Watson v. Jones."), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1131 (1981).  Three years later, when the New Jersey Supreme 
Court was confronted again with an intrachurch dispute, this time 
involving employment rather than property in a congregational 
(non-hierarchical) church, see Chavis v. Rowe, 459 A.2d 674, 678 
(N.J. 1983), the court reaffirmed its declaration in Graves that 
the choice between the Watson or the neutral-principles approach, 
"depend[s] on the church structure," and held that "New Jersey 
courts are to use neutral principles in adjudicating property 
disputes within a congregational church."  459 A.2d at 678. 
         Were these the only applicable cases considering the 
issue, we would find problematic the district court's decision 
here, followed by the magistrate judge, to apply the neutral- 
principles approach inasmuch as it appears that the AUMP Church 
is hierarchical.  However, the district and magistrate judges 
relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court's later decision in Elmora 
Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991), where 
the court stated that in resolving intrachurch disputes "a court 
may, where appropriate, apply neutral principles of law to 
determine disputed questions that do not implicate religious 
doctrine."  Id. at 730.   
         The Conference, though conceding that "[it] is not 
clear what election New Jersey has made between deference and 
neutral principles," Appellant's brief at 21, argues that because 
Elmora Hebrew Center involved an employment rather than a 
property dispute, it is not controlling here and that Graves is 
authoritative evidence of New Jersey's adoption of the deference 
rule in church property disputes.  It views Graves as the only 
strictly "authoritative" declaration of the state supreme court 
because it, like this case, involved a property dispute within a 
hierarchical church organization whereas the subsequent New 
Jersey Supreme Court opinions featuring discussion of the 
deference and neutral-principles approaches, including Elmora 
Hebrew Center, were rendered in non-property contexts.   
         However, the Conference offers no principled basis for 
treating property disputes differently from other types of civil 
disputes in this regard, nor has the New Jersey Supreme Court 
suggested that such a distinction is relevant.  Rather, that 
court has indicated, particularly in its most recent opinions on 
this issue, that the appropriate level of review turns not on the 
type of civil dispute involved but on the extent to which the 
dispute implicates questions of religious doctrine or polity.  
         As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must 
predict how the state supreme court would resolve a given dispute 
where the applicable state law is unclear.  See Clark v. Modern 
Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).  In forming that 
prediction, the federal court "must consider relevant state 
precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly 
works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show 
how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at 
hand."  McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). 
         We have recognized, along with respected commentators, 
that "[c]onsidered dicta by the state's highest court may provide 
a federal court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal 
might rule on a particular question," and be considered 
"'conclusive,'" particularly if it is "'a carefully considered 
statement by the state court.'"  Id. at 662 & n.21 (quoting C. 
Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 58, at 270 (3d ed. 1976)). 
         We have even stated that "a federal court sitting in 
diversity may diverge from existing precedent when there is 
sufficient evidence that the highest state court would be willing 
to entertain a change in its common law."  W.A. Wright, Inc. v. 
KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 746 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1984); seealso Becker 
v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d 
Cir. 1977) ("[A] federal court must be sensitive to the doctrinal 
trends of the state whose law it applies.").  "[R]elevant state 
precedents must be scrutinized with an eye toward the broad 
policies that informed those adjudications, and to the doctrinal 
trends which they evince."  McKenna, 622 F.2d at 662 (quoting 1A 
Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 0.307, at 3077 (2d ed. 1979)). 
         Five recent decisions show the New Jersey courts' 
movement towards a rule that calls for application of neutral 
principles regardless of church structure, as long as the dispute 
does not entangle the court in questions of religious doctrine or 
governance.  In McElroy v. Guilfoyle, 589 A.2d 1082 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1990), a Roman Catholic priest sued the Camden 
Diocese and two of its bishops, claiming they had breached a 
promise to pay legal fees the priest incurred in defending 
against criminal charges.  Despite the clearly hierarchical 
structure of the Roman Catholic Church, the court applied neutral 
principles, declaring that 
         secular courts may decide civil disputes 
         between a religious body and its members or 
         its clergy if those disputes involve purely 
         secular issues and can be resolved without 
         entanglement with matters of faith, 
         discipline or doctrine.  In such cases, 
         courts are to apply neutral principles of law 
         to the facts presented. 
 
Id. at 1083-84 (citation omitted).  As this was not the state's 
supreme court, the impact of the court's recommendation of 
neutral-principles analysis would be limited, but for the state 
supreme court's later acceptance of precisely the same analysis. 
         A year later in Elmora Hebrew Center, a case involving 
a suit by a synagogue seeking enforcement of its discharge of a 
rabbi, the New Jersey Supreme Court signalled a realignment in 
support of the neutral-principles approach in property disputes: 
         [C]ourts have arrived at several acceptable 
         means for confining their adjudications to 
         the proper civil sphere.  Civil courts can 
         accept the authority of a recognized 
         religious body in resolving a particular 
         doctrinal question.  In disputes involving a 
         church governed by a hierarchical structure, 
         courts should defer to the result reached by 
         the highest church authority to have 
         considered the religious question at issue.  
         Similarly, in disputes involving a church 
         with a congregational structure, courts 
         should defer to resolutions by a majority (or 
         other appropriate subgroup) of the church's 
         governing body. 
               
              Without regard to the governing 
         structure of a particular church, a court 
         may, where appropriate, apply neutral 
         principles of law to determine disputed 
         questions that do not implicate religious 
         doctrine.  "Neutral principles" are wholly 
         secular legal rules whose application to 
         religious parties or disputes does not entail 
         theological or doctrinal evaluations. 
 
593 A.2d at 729-30 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
         Thus, in Elmora Hebrew Center the New Jersey Supreme 
Court appears to have abandoned the bright-line rule formed in 
Graves and Chavis that the deference approach be applied to 
disputes in hierarchical churches and the neutral-principles 
doctrine be applied to disputes in congregational churches.  
Particularly significant is the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
statement in Elmora Hebrew Center that "[t]his 'neutral 
principles' approach is particularly suited to adjudications of 
property disputes," id. at 730, and that "[t]he application of 
the 'neutral principles' doctrine presents the potential 
advantage of permitting parties to assure a consistent approach 
to questions of property ownership or church membership by 
inclusion of appropriate terms in deeds, contracts, or by-laws," 
id.  The court's glowing, and certainly gratuitous, commendation 
of neutral-principles analysis in intrachurch property disputes 
strongly suggests a willingness to shift accordingly in an 
appropriate case. 
         The same indication was given by the state supreme 
court a year later in a pair of cases decided the same day.  In 
Welter v. Seton Hall University, 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992), former 
nuns who had been discharged by Seton Hall, a Catholic 
university, sued, alleging that the University had breached their 
employment contracts.  A court of the state's appellate division 
had concluded that the dispute was not one for civil 
adjudication, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.  Citing 
"Justice Handler's comprehensive opinion" in Elmora Hebrew 
Center, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated categorically that 
"[i]n appropriate circumstances a court may apply neutral 
principles of law to determine disputed questions that do not 
implicate religious doctrine."  Id. at 212. 
         The court emphasized that a court's choice between the 
deference and neutral-principles approaches should turn on 
whether the dispute implicates questions of religious doctrine or 
polity.  "Only when the underlying dispute turns on doctrine or 
polity should courts abdicate their duty to enforce secular 
rights.  Judicial deference beyond that demarcation would 
transform our courts into rubber stamps invariably favoring a 
religious institution's decision regarding even primarily secular 
disputes."  Id. at 213.   
         Perhaps alluding to Graves, it further explained: 
         This case differs markedly from the vast 
         majority of previous intra-religion cases, 
         which challenged deprivations of a party's 
         status within a religion and which concerned 
         only incidental deprivations of the secular 
         trappings of that former status within the 
         faith.  Just as the existence of a tangential 
         secular issue does not authorize civil courts 
         to override primarily doctrinal 
         determinations by authorities in hierarchial 
         [sic] religions, inconsequential doctrinal 
         issues that were irrelevant to the employment 
         relationship do not preclude doctrinally- 
         objective enforcement of a secular interest 
         pursuant to a secular agreement. 
 
Id. at 217 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).   
         The other case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
that day, Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 A.2d 
218 (N.J. 1992), provided an example of a case in which judicial 
application of neutral principles was not appropriate.  There a 
professor brought suit against a seminary alleging breach of an 
employment promise.  Determining that the professor performed a 
"ministerial function" and held "doctrinally-sensitive" 
responsibilities, the court concluded that to interfere in the 
church's employment decisions regarding such a position would 
necessarily involve impermissible entanglement in matters of 
church polity.  Id. at 223-24.  The court cited extensively to 
its opinions in Elmora Hebrew Center and Welter but made no 
reference to Graves. 
         Finally, in Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 
A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952 (1993), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's opinion reinforced limitation of the 
Watson approach to only those property disputes that are 
doctrinally charged, and affirmatively endorsed the use of 
neutral-principles analysis in property disputes: 
         We recognized in Elmora Hebrew Center that 
         civil courts may resolve controversies 
         involving religious groups if resolution can 
         be achieved by reference to neutral 
         principles of law, but that they may not 
         resolve such controversies if resolution 
         requires the interpretation of religious 
         doctrine.  Neutral principles may be 
         particularly suited for adjudications of 
         property disputes, or civil contract actions, 
         but not where disputes involve 
         interpretations of religious doctrine itself. 
 
Id. at 1363 (citations omitted). 
 
         The New Jersey cases we have examined show a decided 
progression of New Jersey court decisions toward adoption of a 
neutral-principles approach in resolving intrachurch property 
disputes like the one before us.  We thus conclude that the 
magistrate judge's application of that approach was not 
inconsistent with the law of New Jersey, and therefore not legal 
error.   We turn then to examine the Conference's contentions in 
light of this legal background. 
C. Analysis in Light of "Neutral Principles" 
         The Conference contends that its dispute with Scotts 
Church is an intrachurch governance dispute, one over church 
organization or administration, and not simply one over ownership 
of property.  It argues that, therefore, whether the forum state 
has adopted the approach requiring deference or neutral 
principles, a court is obligated to defer to superior church 
authority. 
         We reject that argument, as did the trial court, 
because it is clear that this dispute is hardly one of 
"governance."  Unlike the issue in Kedroff, which entailed a 
decision whether the Russian Orthodox Archbishop in America had 
been properly selected, or in Milivojevich, which centered on 
whether the Serbian Orthodox Bishop in North America had been 
properly removed, this case is only incidentally ecclesiastical.  
Instead, it consists almost entirely of a raw dispute over 
property rights.  In Milivojevich the Supreme Court distinguished 
between the two, stating, "this case essentially involves not a 
church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution 
of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil 
tribunals."  426 U.S. at 709.   
         The Conference suggests that its decision in April 1991 
to require all the congregations to quitclaim their real property 
interests was one of governance, but that action was not nearly 
as doctrinally charged as that in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 
(1975), where the Presbyterian Church declared one faction of a 
divided congregation to be the "true" congregation.  Yet even in 
Jones, the United States Supreme Court authorized the Georgia 
courts to use neutral principles to override the hierarchical 
church's determination.  
         More importantly, the extent to which a court may 
permissibly inquire into disputes of this kind turns on the 
specific elements of the inquiry itself and the degree to which 
it might trench upon doctrinally sensitive matters, rather than 
on conclusory labelling of the whole dispute as either "secular" 
or "ecclesiastical."  Examination of the trial court's 
determinations here shows that most of them were unquestionably 
free of doctrinal relevance.  The trial court's finding that the 
phrase in Scotts Church's certificate of incorporation, "to hold 
same in trust for the uses and purposes of said Church Body," 
referred to Scotts Church was based principally on the absence of 
any mention of the Conference in the certificate's text, and the 
reappearance of the phrase "said Church Body" in the same 
certificate's two-thirds vote and members-in-good-standing 
provisions.  Neither consideration implicates "questions of 
religious doctrine, polity, [or] practice."  Jones, 443 U.S. at 
603.  
         The trial court used similar legal analysis of language 
in rejecting the Signature Resolution as a basis for the 
quitclaim deed's validity, noting that its text had nothing to 
say about property transfers.  In doing so, the court accepted 
the representations of Conference officials regarding the 
Resolution's limited effect.  Neither of these passive inferences 
was anything more than the neutral, fact-driven conclusion that 
every conventional property or contract suit demands. 
         Although some aspects of the trial court's opinion -- 
interpreting provisions of the Book of Discipline, for example -- 
may have touched on the church-governance sphere, they were 
irrelevant to the ultimate determination.  The trial court's 
alternative ground for decision, its application of the state-law 
conflict rule, was free of doctrinal implications and provides an 
adequate basis for affirmance. 
         The trial court determined that even if the terms of 
the Book of Discipline, including the Property Resolution, were 
assumed effective and binding on Scotts Church, they simply 
functioned as Scotts Church's corporate bylaws.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 15A:1-2(c) ("'Bylaws' means the code of rules adopted for 
the regulation or management of the affairs of the corporation 
irrespective of the name by which these rules are 
designated[.]").  Indeed, the Conference itself described the 
Book of Discipline as "bylaws" at oral argument.  Because those 
terms conflicted with Scotts Church's certificate of 
incorporation, which requires a two-thirds vote by church members 
before any property is transferred, and because New Jersey law 
states that in such conflicts the certificate prevails, it 
followed that the two-thirds vote requirement had not been 
overridden, and no property transfer had been effected.  See App. 
at 38-39.  Since the Signature Resolution was an amendment to the 
Book of Discipline and the secession clause was one of its 
original provisions, they are also by-laws which under New Jersey 
law cannot override Scotts Church's certificate of incorporation. 
         The trial court's application of the conflict rule was 
consistent with the well-established rule in New Jersey that 
provisions of a corporation's charter or articles of 
incorporation enjoy priority over contradictory or inconsistent 
by-laws.  See Leeds v. Harrison, 87 A.2d 713, 717-18, 720 (N.J. 
1952) (religious nonprofit corporation may adopt by-laws only "if 
conformable and subordinate to" corporation's charter);          
L.L. Constantin & Co. v. R.P. Holding Corp., 153 A.2d 378, 383 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1959) ("[W]here inconsistency exists 
between by-laws and certificate of incorporation, the latter 
ordinarily governs . . . ."); see also Elkins v. Camden & 
Atlantic Railroad Co., 36 N.J. Eq. 467, 468-69 (N.J. Ch. 1883); 
Kearney v. Andrews, 10 N.J. Eq. 70, 72-74 (N.J. Ch. 1854); Model 
Business Corporation Act Annotated § 2.06(c) (3d ed. 1993); 18 
C.J.S. Corporations §§ 112(a), 114(a), 115(d) (1990); 18A Am. 
Jur. 2d Corporations §§ 313, 314 (1985 & Supp. 1996).   
         The trial court's holding was also consistent with the 
Delaware Court of Chancery's resolution of a case nearly 
identical to this one filed against the Conference by a local 
Delaware AUFCMP church that involved a quitclaim deed signed at 
the same April 6, 1991 meeting at issue here.  See Mother AUFCMP 
Church v. Conference of AUFCMP Church, No. 12055, 1991 WL 85846 
(Del. Ch. May 16, 1991).  As in this case the Conference defended 
the validity of the quitclaim deed by reference to the Property 
and Signature Resolutions and, as in this case, the local 
church's certificate of incorporation pre-dated the incorporation 
of the Conference in 1941 and specified that property could not 
be transferred without the consent of two-thirds of the members 
of the local church.  The court's language in that decision could 
apply equally to Scotts Church: 
         [B]y the defendants' own characterization, 
         those documents [the Property and Signature 
         Resolutions] occupy, at best, the status of 
         by-laws of the [local church].  Assuming 
         without deciding the validity of that 
         characterization, the January 12th "by-law" 
         placing local church properties "in trust" 
         for the Conference runs afoul of the 
         principle that where a by-law conflicts with 
         the provisions of the charter, the by-law is 
         a nullity. 
   
Id. at *8; see also St. Thomas AUMP Church v. Conference of 
AUFCMP Church, No. 13006-NC, 1995 WL 694390 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 
1995) (applying collateral estoppel to the Conference's claims 
based on the adverse decision Mother AUFCMP Church). 
         Thus, even if the Conference's claims regarding its 
Property Resolution, Signature Resolution, and secession clause 
are given full weight, under basic, well-established principles 
of state law, they cannot override the certificate of 
incorporation's two-thirds vote requirement.  Application of this 
neutral rule of priority effectively disposes of the Conference's 
principal contentions without engagement of any ecclesiastically 
sensitive issues.  Significantly, the Conference has not 
mentioned -- let alone challenged -- this independent basis for 
the trial court's decision. 
         The Conference's remaining arguments are decidedly less 
compelling, and we discuss each of them only briefly. 
         The Conference devotes much of its briefs to its 
contention that the magistrate judge erred in rejecting its claim 
that it is the legal successor to the 1813 "Union Church of 
Africans," arguing that the judge erroneously failed to admit 
evidence proving that fact and that these errors "caused most of 
its other errors."  See Brief of Appellant at 14-16. 
Paradoxically, at oral argument, it conceded that this issue is 
"not important."  In any event, the argument is inconsequential.  
Even if the Conference were assumed to be successor to the Union 
Church, that at most suggests that the term "said Church Body" in 
Scotts Church's 1915 certificate of incorporation could have 
referred to a denominational church already extant at that time.  
The magistrate judge, however, concluded that "said Church Body" 
referred to Scotts Church itself, and did so on the independent 
ground that the portion of the certificate of incorporation 
requiring "a vote of two thirds of the members of said Church 
Body, who shall have been members in good standing in said Church 
Body" was a clear indication that "said Church Body" was the 
Scotts Church congregation proper, not the entire AUMP hierarchy.  
See App. at 16-17.   
         The Conference also argues that the trial court erred 
in determining that the Conference had not contributed any of the 
money paid for the Baird Boulevard property.  That is a factual 
finding that is not clearly erroneous.  In any event, absent 
either an indication that any controlling terms in the relevant 
instruments tied property entitlement to actual expenditure or 
some request for equitable intervention, the source of the 
purchase price is irrelevant.  To the extent the decision by the 
trial court turned on its findings of fact, we conclude that none 
of the dispositive findings is clearly erroneous.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
                               III.     
                            Conclusion 
         To summarize, we view as correct the district court's 
determination that a neutral-principles approach may be applied 
in New Jersey to resolve hierarchical intrachurch property 
disputes.  We additionally find no error in the magistrate 
judge's application of neutral-principles analysis and resulting 
substantive determinations that the April 6, 1991 quitclaim deed 
is invalid and that Scotts Church remains the valid titleholder 
to its Baird Boulevard property.  We will therefore affirm the 
judgment of the district court.  
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